The Hidden Lifelines Beneath the Sea: Why Submarine Cable Security Matters to Japan
By Yuta Arai
When we think about the internet, we usually imagine satellites, wireless networks, and data centers. Yet much of the world's digital communication depends on something far less visible: submarine cables lying on the ocean floor. From financial transactions to everyday emails, they quietly support modern life. However, recent incidents in the Baltic Sea and around Taiwan have raised an important question: how can countries protect this critical infrastructure from deliberate interference? For Japan, an island nation deeply connected to the global economy, this is a far from distant concern.
In December 2024, the tanker Eagle S was suspected of damaging underwater cables between Finland and Estonia. Finnish prosecutors alleged that the vessel dragged its anchor for approximately 90 kilometers, damaging several submarine cables. Similar concerns emerged around Taiwan following a cable damage incident involving a commercial vessel in February 2025. In November 2026, the Helsinki District Court also convicted two crew members of the cargo ship Fitburg in connection with cable damage in the Gulf of Finland, although the judgment is not yet final. These incidents demonstrate how ordinary commercial vessels can pose serious risks to critical infrastructure. While dragging an anchor may result from a navigational accident, it can also be used for deliberate sabotage. Distinguishing between accidents, negligence, and intentional interference has therefore become an increasingly important maritime security challenge.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the basic legal framework governing submarine cables. Articles 79 and 87 recognize the right to lay cables on the continental shelf and the freedom to lay them on the high seas, while Article 113 requires states to establish laws addressing certain intentional or negligent damage. However, these provisions do not automatically authorize coastal states to intervene against foreign vessels suspected of damaging cables. For example, if a foreign-flagged vessel damages a cable within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), can the Japan Coast Guard immediately stop and board it? Not necessarily. Although coastal states possess important rights within their EEZs, they do not exercise the same sovereignty as within territorial waters. Enforcement measures against foreign vessels therefore require an additional legal basis, potentially involving flag-state consent or other applicable international rules.
Recent Finnish cases highlight these jurisdictional difficulties. In the Fitburg case, the Helsinki District Court accepted criminal jurisdiction partly because the consequences of the offenses occurred in Finland. Nevertheless, criminal jurisdiction and the authority to enforce domestic law against foreign vessels at sea remain separate legal questions. A state may have grounds to prosecute an offense without necessarily possessing the authority to board or arrest a foreign vessel beyond its territorial sea. This distinction exposes an important weakness in the international legal framework: a country may suffer serious damage to its communications infrastructure while possessing limited powers to intervene directly against the suspected vessel. As submarine cables become increasingly important to national security, the relationship between coastal-state jurisdiction, flag-state authority, and infrastructure protection deserves greater international attention.
These challenges are particularly relevant to Japan. According to a 2025 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), approximately 99 percent of Japan's communications depend on submarine cables. A major disruption could affect financial institutions, government services, businesses, and ordinary internet users. Japan also faces a challenging maritime security environment, particularly in the East China Sea and surrounding waters. To address these risks, Japan should strengthen maritime surveillance through closer cooperation among the Japan Coast Guard, Maritime Self-Defense Force, and private cable operators. It should also review its domestic legal framework to clarify investigative authority, evidence collection procedures, and cooperation with foreign authorities when cable damage occurs beyond territorial waters. At the same time, Japan should improve infrastructure resilience by diversifying cable routes, protecting landing stations, and developing alternative communications systems. International cooperation and public private partnerships will be essential to these efforts.
Submarine cables rarely attract public attention until something goes wrong. Yet their security is increasingly connected to economic stability, national defense, and international relations. UNCLOS remains essential to maintaining order at sea, but its rules were developed before today's profound dependence on digital infrastructure. For Japan, protecting submarine cables requires more than physical security measures. It demands a comprehensive approach combining international law, effective maritime law enforcement, technological resilience, and cooperation with international partners. Ultimately, the next major maritime security challenge may not begin with a warship crossing a disputed boundary. It could begin with an ordinary- looking commercial vessel lowering its anchor.
References
1. Finnish Prosecution Service. (2025, August 11). Charges Have Been Brought in the Case Concerning the Cutting of Submarine Cables in the Gulf of Finland During Christmas 2024.
2. Helsinki District Court. (2026, November 5). [District Court Issues Judgment in the Fitburg Case].
3. United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Articles 56, 58, 79, 87, 92, 110, and 112–115.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
4. Murphy, E. L., & Bryja, T. (2025). The Strategic Future of Subsea Cables: Japan Case Study. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-future-subsea-cables-japan-case-study
5. Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Strategic Future of Subsea Cables: A Guidebook for the Next Two Administrations. Strategic Infrastructure Program.
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